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Abstract
There is evidence that Russia’s Internet Research Agency
attempted to interfere with the 2016 U.S. election by run-
ning fake accounts on Twitter—often referred to as “Russian
trolls”. In this work, we: 1) develop machine learning models
that predict whether a Twitter account is a Russian troll within
a set of 170K control accounts; and, 2) demonstrate that it is
possible to use this model to find active accounts on Twitter
still likely acting on behalf of the Russian state. Using both
behavioral and linguistic features, we show that it is possible
to distinguish between a troll and a non-troll with a precision
of 78.5% and an AUC of 98.9%, under cross-validation. Ap-
plying the model to out-of-sample accounts still active today,
we find that up to 2.6% of top journalists’ mentions are oc-
cupied by Russian trolls. These findings imply that the Rus-
sian trolls are very likely still active today. Additional anal-
ysis shows that they are not merely software-controlled bots,
and manage their online identities in various complex ways.
Finally, we argue that if it is possible to discover these ac-
counts using externally-accessible data, then the platforms—
with access to a variety of private internal signals—should
succeed at similar or better rates.
1 Introduction
It is widely believed that Russia’s Internet Research Agency
(IRA) tried to interfere with the 2016 U.S. election as well
as other elections by running fake accounts on Twitter—
often called the “Russian troll” accounts (Gorodnichenko,
Pham, and Talavera 2018; Ferrara 2017; Stella, Ferrara,
and De Domenico 2018). This interference could have im-
mense consequences considering the viral nature of some
tweets (Mustafaraj and Metaxas 2010; Metaxas and Musta-
faraj 2012), the number of users exposed to Russian trolls’
content (Isaac and Wakabayashi 2017; Spangher et al. 2018),
and the critical role social media have played in past polit-
ical campaigns (Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez 2011). In
this paper, we develop models on a dataset of Russian trolls
active on Twitter during the 2016 U.S. elections to predict
currently active Russian trolls. We construct machine learn-
ing classifiers using profile elements, behavioral features,
language distribution, function word usage, and linguistic
features, on a highly unbalanced dataset of Russian troll ac-
counts (2.2K accounts, or 1.4% of our sample) released by
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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Twitter1 and “normal”, control accounts (170K accounts, or
98.6% of our sample) collected by the authors. (See Figure 1
for a visual overview of the process used in this work.) Our
goals are to determine whether “new” trolls can be identified
by models built on “old” trolls and to demonstrate that troll
detection is both possible and efficient, even with “old” data.
We find that it is possible to disambiguate between a Rus-
sian troll account and a large number of these randomly se-
lected control accounts among users. One model, a simple
logistic regression, achieves a precision of 78.5% and an
AUC of 98.9%. Next we asked whether it was possible to
use the model trained on past data to unmask Russian trolls
currently active on Twitter (see Figure 2 for an example)?
The logistic regression is attractive in this context as its sim-
plicity seems most likely to generalize to out-of-sample data.
Toward that end, we apply our classifier to Twitter accounts
that mentioned high-profile journalists in late 2018. We find
the computational model flags 3.7% of them as statistically
likely Russian trolls and find reasonable agreement between
our classifier and human labelers.
Our model allows us to estimate the activity of trolls. As
a case study, we estimate the activity of suspected Russian
troll accounts engaging in one type of adversarial campaign:
engaging with prominent journalists. Since we have no way
of truly knowing which of these model-identified accounts
are truly Russian trolls—perhaps only the IRA knows this—
we perform a secondary human evaluation in order to estab-
lish consensus on whether the model is identifying validly
suspicious accounts. Our human evaluation process suggests
that roughly 70% of these model-flagged accounts—all of
them still currently active on Twitter—are highly likely to be
Russian trolls. As a result, we estimate that Russian trolls oc-
cupy 2.6% of the mentions of high-profile journalists’ men-
tions. Moreover, we find that in contrast with some prevail-
ing narratives surrounding the Russian troll program, the
model-flagged accounts do not score highly on the well-
known Botometer scale (Davis et al. 2016), indicating that
they are not simply automated software agents.
Finally, we perform an exploratory open coding of the
identity deception strategies used by the currently active ac-
counts discovered by our model. For instance, some pretend
1https://about.twitter.com/en_us/values/
elections-integrity.html#data
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Figure 1: Flowchart illustrating the steps of our research pipeline.
to be an American mother or a middle-aged white man via
profile pictures and descriptions, but their tweet rates are ab-
normally high, and their tweets revolve solely around politi-
cal topics.
This paper makes the following three contributions, build-
ing on an emerging line of scholarship around the Russian
troll accounts (Stewart, Arif, and Starbird 2018; Spangher et
al. 2018; Griffin and Bickel 2018; Zannettou et al. 2018b;
Boatwright, Linvill, and Warren 2018; Boyd et al. 2018).
First, we show that it is possible to separate Russian trolls
from other accounts in the data previous to 2019, and that
this computational model is still accurate on 2019 data. As a
corollary, we believe this work establishes that a large num-
ber of Russian troll accounts are likely to be currently active
on Twitter. Second, we provide our model to the research
community.2 This will enable other researchers to study their
own questions about the trolls, such as “What are their ob-
jectives?” and “How are they changing over time?” Third,
we find that accounts flagged by our model as Russian trolls
are not merely bots but use diverse ways to build and man-
age their online identities. Finally, we argue that if it is pos-
sible to discover these accounts using externally-accessible
data, then the social platforms—with access to a variety of
private, internal signals—should succeed at similar or better
rates at finding and deactivating Russian troll accounts.
2 Related Work
First, we review what is known about Russian’s interfer-
ence in Western democracies via online campaigns, and then
move on to the emerging work on these 2016 election related
Russian trolls themselves. We conclude by discussing work
on social bots, and by reviewing theories of online deception
that inform the quantitative approaches in this paper.
2.1 Russia’s Interference on Political Campaigns
While state-level online interference in democratic pro-
cesses is an emerging phenomenon, new research docu-
ments Russia’s online political manipulation campaigns in
countries other than the United States. For instance, previ-
ous work has shown that a high volume of Russian tweets
were generated a few days before the voting day in the
2URL available after blind review.
case of the 2016 E.U. Referendum (Brexit Referendum), and
then dropped afterwards (Gorodnichenko, Pham, and Talav-
era 2018). Furthermore, it is suspected that Russia is be-
hind the MacronLeaks campaign that occurred during the
2017 French presidential elections period (Ferrara 2017),
as well as the Catalonian referendum (Stella, Ferrara, and
De Domenico 2018).
2.2 Emerging Work on the 2016 Russian Trolls
While a brand new area of scholarship, emerging work has
examined the datasets of Russian trolls released by Twitter.
Researchers from Clemson University identified five cate-
gories of trolls and argued the behavior between these cat-
egories were radically different (Boatwright, Linvill, and
Warren 2018). This was especially marked for left- and
right-leaning accounts (the dataset contains both). For in-
stance, the IRA promoted more left-leaning content than
right-leaning on Facebook, while right-leaning Twitter han-
dles received more engagement. (Spangher et al. 2018).
New work has looked at how the Russian troll accounts
were retweeted in the context of the #BlackLivesMatter
movement (Stewart, Arif, and Starbird 2018)—a movement
targeted by the trolls. The retweets were divided among dif-
ferent political perspectives and the trolls took advantage of
this division. There is some disagreement about how pre-
dictable the Russian trolls are. Griffin and Bickel (2018) ar-
gue that the Russian trolls are composed of accounts with
common but customized behavioral characteristics that can
be used for future identification (Griffin and Bickel 2018),
while other work has shown that the trolls’ tactics and tar-
gets change over time, implying that the task of automatic
detection is not simple (Zannettou et al. 2018b). Finally, the
Russian trolls show unique linguistic behavior as compared
to a baseline cohort (Boyd et al. 2018).
Users Who Interact with the Trolls. Recent work has
also examined the users who interact with the Russian trolls
on Twitter. For example, misinformation produced by the
Russian trolls was shared more often by conservatives than
liberals on Twitter (Badawy, Ferrara, and Lerman 2018).
Models can predict which users will spread the trolls’ con-
tent by making use of political ideology, bot likelihood
scores, and activity-related account metadata (Badawy, Ler-
man, and Ferrara 2018).
Measuring the Propaganda’s Effect. Researchers have
also worked to understand the influence of the Russian
trolls’ propaganda efforts on social platforms by using Face-
book’s ads data, IRA related tweets on Twitter, and log data
from browsers. 1 in 40,000 internet users were exposed to
the IRA ads on any given day, but there was variation among
left and right-leaning content (Spangher et al. 2018). Fur-
thermore, the influence of the trolls have been measured in
platforms like Reddit, Twitter, Gab, and 4chan’s Politically
Incorrect board (/pol/) using Hawkes Processes (Zannettou
et al. 2018b).
2.3 Bots
While some bots are built for helpful things such as auto-
replies, bots can also often be harmful, such as when they
steal personal information on social platforms (Ferrara et
al. 2016) and spread misinformation (Shao et al. 2017;
Gorodnichenko, Pham, and Talavera 2018). Previous re-
search has shown that bots largely intervened with the 2016
election. For instance, bots were responsible for millions
of tweets right before the 2016 election (Bessi and Ferrara
2016). This was not the first time, as a disinformation cam-
paign was coordinated through bots before the 2017 French
presidential election (Ferrara 2017). Current attempts to de-
tect bots include systems based on social network informa-
tion, systems based on crowdsourcing and human intelli-
gence, and machine-learning methods using indicative fea-
tures (Ferrara et al. 2016). However, previous findings show
it is becoming harder to filter out bots due to their sophisti-
cated behavior (Subrahmanian et al. 2016), such as posting
material collected from the Web at predetermined times.
2.4 Deception and Identity Online
Russian trolls tried to mask their identities on Twitter, for in-
stance pretending to an African-American activists support-
ing #BlackLivesMatter (Arif, Stewart, and Starbird 2018).
Seminal research has shown the importance of identities
vary by online communities (Donath 2002). For example,
the costliness of faking certain social signals is related
to their trustworthiness (Donath 2002), an insight that we
use to compose quantitative features. The importance and
salience of identity signals (and possible deception through
them) extend to nearly all social platforms. Online dating
site users attend to small details in others’ profiles and are
careful when crafting their own profiles, since fewer cues
meant the importance of the remaining ones were ampli-
fied (Ellison, Heino, and Gibbs 2006). MySpace users listed
books, movies, and TV shows in profiles to build elaborate
taste performances in order to convey prestige, differenti-
ation, or aesthetic preference (Liu 2007). And on Twitter,
users manage their self-presentation both via profiles and
ongoing conversations (Marwick and boyd 2011).
3 Data
To model and identify potential Russian Trolls on Twitter,
we first construct a large dataset of both known Russian troll
accounts and a control cohort of regular users.
Figure 2: Example of a flagged account replying back to a
high-profile journalist on Twitter.
3.1 Russian Trolls
The suspected Russian interference in the 2016 US presi-
dential election led to multiple federal and industry inves-
tigations to identify bad actors and analyze their behavior
(Jensen 2018). As a part of these efforts, Twitter officially
released a new dataset of 3,841 accounts believed to be con-
nected to the Internet Research Agency (IRA). This dataset
contains features such as profile description, account cre-
ation date, and poll choices. In our paper, we used the Rus-
sian troll accounts from this new dataset for our analysis,
and model construction.
Out of the 3,841 accounts, we focus on the 2,286 accounts
whose users selected English as their language of choice.
This choice was due to our goal of distinguishing a Russian
troll trying to imitate a normal US user from a US user, of
which the vast majority speak only English. However, we
note that despite a user selecting English, users may still
tweet occasionally in other languages. We use the most re-
cent 200 tweets from each troll account to form a linguistic
sample. This allows us to directly compare the trolls with
other Twitter users, whose tweets are collected via a single
Twitter API call, which only provides 200 tweets. In total
346,711 tweets from the Russian troll dataset were used to
construct the classifiers.
3.2 Control Accounts
To contrast with troll behavior, we construct a control dataset
of users whose behavior is expected to be typical of US ac-
counts. The initial control accounts are drawn from a histori-
cal 10% sample of Twitter data and then iteratively refined as
by geography and activity time. To ensure geographic prox-
imity in the US, the total variation method (Compton, Jur-
gens, and Allen 2014) is used to geolocate all users.
We then took a random sample of US-located users and
ensured they tweeted at least 5 times between 2012-2017,
to match the tweet activity times in the Russian troll co-
hort. We then randomly sampled 171,291 of these accounts,
which we refer to as control accounts in the rest of the paper.
This creates a substantial class imbalance, with 98.6% con-
trol accounts to 1.4% Russian troll accounts; this imbalance
matches real-world expectations that such troll accounts are
relatively rare (though it is difficult to know a priori ex-
actly how rare). For each control account, the most recent
200 tweets are collected (due to API restrictions), for a total
Russian Trolls Control Accounts
Total # of Accounts 2,286 (1.4%) 171,291 (98.6%)
Total # of Tweets 346,711 29,960,070
Avg Account Age (days) 1679.2 2734.5
Avg # of Followers 1731.8 1197
Avg # of Following 952 536.5
Table 1: Description of the dataset used to construct models.
dataset size of 29,960,070 tweets. The total dataset is sum-
marized in Table 1.
3.3 Journalists’ Mentions
Recent research at the intersection of social media and jour-
nalism confirms that journalists use Twitter as a source of
tips, especially for breaking news (Willnat and Weaver 2018;
Swasy 2016). If the trolls’ goals are to influence the conver-
sation about U.S. politics, contacting journalists is a natural
strategy to influence news coverage and shape public opin-
ion. Therefore, as a case study, we collect unseen accounts
who have recently contacted high-profile political journalists
on Twitter (Figure 2). High-profile journalists were selected
from a pre-compiled Twitter list 3 and the Twitter API was
used to collect 47,426 mentions of these 57 journalists, re-
sulting in in 39,103 unique accounts on which we could ap-
ply our model. These accounts represent out-of-sample data
for the model.
4 Method
Next, we describe how our classifiers were constructed, and
then how we performed human evaluation on the classifiers’
predictions on unseen, out-of-sample Twitter accounts.
4.1 Constructing Classifiers
Our goal is to build classifiers that can detect potential Rus-
sian trolls still active on Twitter. In order to characterize user
accounts during classification, we used features that can be
grouped into 5 broad categories.
Profile features. Considering that the Russian trolls are
likely to have more recently created Twitter accounts (Zan-
nettou et al. 2018b), we calculated the time since creation
by counting the number of days since a Twitter account’s
creation date up to January 1, 2019. We also hypothesized
there would be a difference in profile descriptions since it
requires human effort to customize one’s profile (Badawy,
Ferrara, and Lerman 2018). Thus, we calculated the length
of profile (characters). Additionally, previous research has
shown that Russian trolls tend to follow a lot of users, prob-
ably to increase the number of their followers (Zannettou et
al. 2018a). So, we also calculated the number of followers,
number of following, and the ratio of followers to following
for each Twitter account.
Behavioral features. The behavioral features we computed
were broadly in four categories: i) hashtags, ii) mentions, iii)
shared links (URLs), and iv) volume and length of (re)tweets
3https://twitter.com/mattklewis/lists/
political-journalists?lang=en
(i.e., tweets and retweets). First, considering that the Russian
trolls used a high number of certain hashtags before and after
the election (Zannettou et al. 2018b), we hypothesized there
would be a difference in the usage of hashtags and calculated
the average number of hashtags (words) and average num-
ber of hashtags (characters). Next, we calculated the aver-
age number of mentions (per tweet), as Russian trolls tend to
mention more unique users compared to a randomly selected
set of normal users (Zannettou et al. 2018a). In order to cap-
ture the Russian trolls’ behaviors regarding the sharing of
links (URLs) in (re)tweets, we also calculated the average
number of links (per tweet), ratio of retweets that contain
links among all tweets, and ratio of tweets that contain links
among all tweets. Prior research has shown that temporal be-
haviors such as retweet rate (i.e., the rate at which accounts
retweet content on Twitter) are useful in identifying online
campaigns (Ghosh, Surachawala, and Lerman 2011). There-
fore, we calculated the average number of tweets (per day),
standard deviation of number of tweets (per day), and ra-
tio of number of retweets out of all tweets (retweet rate) for
measuring (re)tweet volume and rate. Additionally, we cal-
culated the average number of characters of tweets for ob-
taining tweet length.
Stop word usage features. Prior research has shown that
non-native English speakers use function words, such as ar-
ticles, and highly-frequent content words (e.g,. “good”) at
different dates than native speakers (Ionin, Zubizarreta, and
Maldonado 2008; Nicolai and Kondrak 2014), which allows
recovering their originally spoken language even when the
speaker is fluent. We hypothesized that the linguistic cues
in function words enable identifying Russian trolls due to
their non-native language skills. We used the list of 179 stop
words provided by the Python library sklearn4 to calculate
their frequency rates (Pedregosa et al. 2011); this set is a
superset of function words and common content words typ-
ically used but allows for maximum reproducibility by oth-
ers. For each stop word, we calculated the ratio of the num-
ber of each stop word’s occurrences among all words present
in all tweets by a Twitter account.
Language distribution features. Additionally, we com-
puted the distribution of languages used by a Twitter ac-
count, by examining the account’s timeline. For example,
if 5% of all tweets within a user’s timeline were written in
Russian, then the feature value for Russian would be calcu-
lated as 0.05. A total of 82 languages were identified when
computing the intersection of all distinct languages used, af-
ter combining all the tweets made by Russian troll accounts
and control accounts. In order to identify the language for
tweets, we used the Google CLD2 library.
Bag of Words features. Finally, we tokenized the tweets
(converted to lowercase), and broke the text contained in
each tweet into words, discarding stopwords (which are cap-
tured above). Using these words, we extracted unigrams and
bigrams from the text, and constructed a vocabulary for
all tweets, containing only the top 5000 most frequent n-
4https://github.com/scikit-learn/
scikit-learn/blob/master/sklearn/feature_
extraction/stop_words.py
grams. During the classification phase, each tweet can be
represented as a feature vector of all words and phrases
(n-grams) present in the vocabulary (i.e., a Bag of Words
(BoW) model), and the feature values would be the fre-
quency of occurrence.
Classifiers. We ran classification tests using Logistic Re-
gression, Decision Tree (maximum depth 10), and Adaptive
Boosted Decision Tree, using all 5 categories of features de-
scribed above. In order to understand the importance of each
individual category of features, we built 5 additional classi-
fiers, one for each category of features, as shown in Table 3.
4.2 Testing on Unseen Data & Human Evaluation
While it’s interesting to model data previous to 2019 from
Twitter, a core question is: How does this model perform on
present-day Twitter? In order to answer this question, we ap-
plied the computational models described above to unseen,
out-of-sample Twitter accounts (the journalists’ mentions),
and manually assessed the models’ predictions.
Out-of-sample Twitter accounts. For further analysis,
we picked the Logistic Regression classifier trained on all
features, as Logistic Regression’s simplicity seems most
likely to generalize to out-of-sample data. We ran this clas-
sifier on 39,103 unique (unseen) accounts that mentioned 57
high-profile political journalists on Twitter (see Figure 2 for
an example), in order to flag suspicious accounts that resem-
ble Russian trolls. We use the term “flagged accounts” for
the accounts among the journalists’ mentions that were clas-
sified as a potential Russian troll by the model we built, and
“unflagged accounts” for the accounts that were not clas-
sified as such. However, we have left the world of ground
truth, since there is no hard evidence or labels available to
prove or disprove the classifiers’ prediction regarding an un-
seen Twitter account resembling a Russian troll.
Validation through human evaluation. As a result, we
included an additional validation step, and employed human
evaluation in order to assess the quality of classifier pre-
dictions, regarding unseen Twitter accounts that mentioned
high-profile journalists. Out of all the potential Russian troll
accounts that were flagged by the classifier, we randomly
selected 50 of these flagged accounts for the manual valida-
tion step. In addition to these 50 flagged accounts, we also
included 50 unflagged accounts, which were also randomly
selected for human evaluation. These 100 Twitter accounts
were combined in random order and manually annotated by
three trained raters, one of which also had Political Science
expertise. Their task was to independently rate how likely it
was for a given Twitter account to be a Russian troll. An-
notators were not told how many accounts were flagged by
the classifier in order to reduce confirmation bias (Nickerson
1998).
Training for the manual inspection. Before the human
evaluation was conducted, the three raters spent over 12
hours, during a course of 4 weeks, examining the tweets
made by Russian trolls, that was officially released by Twit-
ter (dataset described in Section 3.1). The raters examined
the tweet’s content as well as hashtags, links, mentions in
the tweets and the trolls’ language usage.
Execution of the manual inspection. The raters were in-
structed to go to each account’s profile page and indepen-
dently study the profile/background image, description, ac-
count creation date, etc., and examine the most recent 20
tweets from each of these 100 accounts, to decide how likely
it was for each account to be a Russian troll. The raters fo-
cused on characteristics like: 1) frequent (re)tweeting and
replying, causing the account to have an abnormal number
of tweets compared to the accounts’ age, 2) default or vague
profiles, 3) whether the account was created recently, 4) be-
havior of (re)tweeting only political content, 5) no evidence
of personal life in its profile page, and 6) extreme statements
and inflammatory hashtags. Working independently, each
rater marked their decision as a rating from 1 to 5, where
5 meant “highly likely the account is a Russian troll”, along
with writing a brief description of the reasoning behind their
decision (e.g., what made the account (un)likely to be a Rus-
sian troll?).
After all three raters completed the evaluation, we calcu-
lated the agreement level among their ratings using Krippen-
dorff’s α (Krippendorff 2011). Finally, we computed the av-
erage rating for each account, to decide whether an account
flagged by the classifier was indeed verified to be a potential
Russian troll, through manual inspection. The average rat-
ings, and the predictions from the classifier were now shown
to the three raters, and they gathered to discuss their obser-
vations regarding the characteristics of flagged accounts.
5 Results
Next, we describe the results of in-domain (2016 election
troll dataset) classification, a SAGE analysis of discrimina-
tive words (Eisenstein, Ahmed, and Xing 2011), and finally
the results of human evaluation on out-of-sample data.
5.1 Cross-validation
To evaluate our models we first performed 10-fold cross val-
idation. In measuring performance, we prioritized precision
since we want to minimize false positives considering their
potential impact (i.e., flagging a normal account as a suspi-
cious account has a large downside). As shown in Table 2,
when using all features, including those from Bag of Words,
we see the simplest model, the Logistic Regression classi-
fier, achieving 78.5% in precision and 98.9% in terms of
AUC. Adaptive Boosted Decision Trees achieves over 85%
for all metrics with the precision being 94.2% and AUC be-
ing 91.2%. Although one might think the baseline here is
about 98.6% considering just predicting “not troll” for all
accounts, accuracy is not the right metric since the dataset is
extremely unbalanced.
We also built classifiers using each category of features in
order to see which features are more crucial. As shown in
Table 3, the classifier built using 5,000 Bag of Word features
performs overall the best, achieving 98% in terms of AUC
and 58% in terms of precision. We can also see each classi-
fier built using language distribution features and stop word
usage features both reach above 80% in terms of AUC.
Algorithm Precision Recall F1 AUC Accuracy
LR 0.785 0.835 0.809 0.989 0.994
DT 0.911 0.775 0.837 0.926 0.996
ADT 0.942 0.884 0.912 0.912 0.998
Table 2: Average performance of the three classifiers using
all features to predict from full data using 10-fold cross val-
idation.
Profile Behavior Language Stop word BoW
Precision 0.07 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.58
Recall 0.01 0.4 0.21 0.39 0.79
F1 0.02 0.3 0.17 0.21 0.66
AUC 0.74 0.76 0.85 0.86 0.98
Accuracy 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.99
Table 3: Average performance of the Logistic Regression
classifiers using each category of features when conducting
10-fold cross validation.
Figure 3: Distributions of average ratings given by 3 raters
per account (flagged versus unflagged).
# of Journalists 57
# of Journalists having at least 1 flagged account 57 (100%)
# of Unique accounts among the mentions 39,103
# of Unique flagged accounts 1,466 (3.7%)
Table 4: Description of the results when testing the model
on unseen accounts that mentioned high-profile journalists
on Twitter.
5.2 SAGE Analysis
As shown in Table 3, the BoW features were important pre-
dictors. Next, we automatically identified keywords in the
vocabulary that distinguished Russian troll accounts from
the rest. In order to do so, we used the most recent 200 tweets
per Russian troll accounts (the same tweets used to construct
our models). As a baseline comparison, we also compiled
the set of tweets made by the control accounts (not identi-
fied to be Russian troll accounts). Our goal was to identify
terms whose frequencies are especially large in the tweets
made by Russian troll accounts, in comparison to tweets by
the control group.
Due to the long-tail nature of word frequencies (Zipf
1949), straightforward comparisons often give unsatisfac-
tory results. The difference in word frequencies between
two groups is usually dominated by stopwords: a 1% differ-
ence in the frequency of “the” or “it” will be larger than the
overall frequency of most terms in the vocabulary. The ra-
tio of word frequencies—equivalent to the difference in log
frequencies, and to pointwise mutual information—has the
converse problem: without carefully tuned smoothing, the
resulting keywords will include only the lowest frequency
terms, suffering from high variance. SAGE offers a middle
ground, selecting keywords by comparing the parameters of
two logistically-parametrized multinomial models, using a
self-tuned regularization parameter to control the tradeoff
between frequent and rare terms (Eisenstein, Ahmed, and
Xing 2011). SAGE has been used successfully for the anal-
ysis of many types of language differences, including age
and gender (Pavalanathan and Eisenstein 2015), and poli-
tics (Sim et al. 2013).
Thus, we conducted SAGE analysis on the text contained
in the tweets made by the two groups of accounts, namely
Russian trolls and control accounts. The top 30 words that
distinguished the English-speaking Russian trolls from the
control accounts are shown in Table 5. We found that the
use of keywords associated with chaos and distrust such
as danger, disaster, crisis, emergency, and attacks distin-
guished Russian troll accounts. We also found that Rus-
sian troll accounts used the names of political figures such
as hillary clinton and obama more frequently compared to
the non-troll accounts. Additionally, Russian troll accounts
used words such as maga (Make America Great Again), a
term often used by conservatives, and keywords related to
the Fukushima disaster, such as fukushima2015.
5.3 Testing on Unseen Data & Human evaluation
As shown in Table 4, the Logistic Regression classifier
trained on all features flagged 1,466 (3.7%) of the 39,103
accounts mentioning journalists as potential Russian trolls,
an average of 25.7 per journalist. All 57 journalists had at
least one account flagged as a potential Russian troll by the
classifier.
We then asked our three raters to independently indicate
how likely they thought 100 sample accounts from the set of
account who mentioned journalists were to actually be Rus-
sian trolls. These 100 sample accounts were a mix of 50 ran-
domly selected flagged accounts and 50 randomly selected
unflagged accounts. Whether each account was flagged or
not was not communicated to the raters. The Krippendorff’s
α for the three sets of ratings was computed to be 0.512, in-
dicating that the agreement level among labelers was mod-
erate (Krippendorff 2011). This is expected considering this
is a very difficult annotation task since the Russian trolls
are intentionally trying to blend in. However, this moderate
agreement level at distinguishing suspected troll accounts
from those of normal users indicates there is some salient
behavioral difference between the two groups. Based on the
human evaluations, the median rating for all accounts (out
of 5.0) provided by the three raters was 2.5 with the me-
dian for the flagged accounts being 3.12. 50% (25/50) of
the flagged accounts scored above 3 on average, indicating
that they closely resembled Russian troll accounts (Figure
n-gram SAGE TreatmentCount
Treatment
Rate
Base
Count
Base
Rate n-gram SAGE
Treatment
Count
Treatment
Rate
Base
Count
Base
Rate
1 fukushima2015 12.19 12498 0.0068 1 5.14e-09 16 rising 3.22 1017 0.0005 7004 3.60e-05
2 fukushimaagain 11.87 8215 0.0045 0 0 17 quotes 3.19 1075 0.0006 7635 3.92e-05
3 ukraine 7.36 9327 0.0051 1018 5.23e-06 18 government 3.17 2543 0.0014 18579 9.55e-05
4 на 6.79 13622 0.0074 2657 1.36e-05 19 politics 3.14 1488 0.0008 11177 5.74e-05
5 не 6.46 8799 0.0048 2373 1.22e-05 20 dangerous 3.07 1390 0.0007 11154 5.73e-05
6 nuclear 5.70 6781 0.0037 3922 2.02e-05 21 awful 3.02 1462 0.0008 12380 6.36e-05
7 danger 4.90 2822 0.0015 3644 1.87e-05 22 quote 2.98 2334 0.0013 20581 1.05e-04
8 disaster 4.74 3427 0.0019 5187 2.67e-05 23 emergency 2.94 911 0.0005 8351 4.29e-05
9 plant 4.14 2697 0.0015 7400 3.80e-05 24 hillary 2.89 1716 0.0009 16541 8.50e-05
10 louisiana 4.04 2031 0.0011 6170 3.17e-05 25 hillary clinton 2.82 544 0.0003 5585 2.87e-05
11 turkey 3.64 2314 0.0013 10509 5.40e-05 26 happy thanksgiving 2.78 671 0.0004 7174 3.69e-05
12 officials 3.54 1320 0.0007 6642 3.41e-05 27 clinton 2.71 1328 0.0007 15260 7.84e-05
13 crisis 3.52 1539 0.0008 7906 4.06e-05 28 attacks 2.69 527 0.0003 6176 3.17e-05
14 midnight 3.40 2859 0.0015 16513 8.49e-05 29 obama 2.63 3194 0.0017 39733 2.04e-04
15 rap 3.32 2575 0.0014 16193 8.32e-05 30 maga 2.61 485 0.0003 6181 3.18e-05
Table 5: Top 30 n-grams distinguishing tweets by Russian troll accounts (treatment group) from control accounts (base group)
obtained through SAGE analysis. SAGE denotes the score obtained for an n-gram through SAGE analysis—n-grams with higher
SAGE scores are more distinguishing of the Russian troll accounts when compared to the control accounts. Treatment and base
count denote the raw frequency count of an n-gram within the treatment and base groups respectively, while treatment and
base rate denote the frequency rate of an n-gram within the treatment and base groups respectively.
3). 70% (i.e., 35/50) of the flagged accounts had at least 2
raters giving them a score above 3, with 84% (42/50) of them
had at least 1 rater giving a score above 3. This is strong ev-
idence for classification generalization, as it is similar to the
in-sample precision scores (these figures correspond to out-
of-sample precision).
6 Analysis of the Flagged Accounts
Next, we examine the bot scores of the model-flagged ac-
counts, as well as other quantitative covariates, such as dele-
tion and suspension rates.
6.1 Botometer Scores
An interesting question we can ask is whether the flagged
accounts are just bot accounts because previous disinforma-
tion campaigns have been coordinated through bots (Ferrara
2017). Researchers at Indiana University provide a tool to
the public called Botometer5 that will assess an account for
bot characteristics (Davis et al. 2016). There are user-based
features, friends features, network features, temporal fea-
tures, content and language features, and sentiment features
used to classify each account (Varol et al. 2017).
Method. For the potential trolls, we use the 1,466 ac-
counts flagged by the Logistic Regression classifier con-
structed by using all features. We randomly selected 1,500
users from the unflagged accounts among the mentions for
the comparison group. For each group we used the Python
Botometer API6 to get each account’s overall bot scores as
well as scores by only using the features per each category.
Results. While the flagged accounts do exhibit some bot-
like characteristics, it seems that it is not a dominant behav-
ior. As shown in Figure 4, although the average bot score
of the accounts flagged as potential Russian trolls is higher
than the unflagged accounts’, both of them are less than 1
(on a 5-point scale).
5https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/
6https://github.com/IUNetSci/
botometer-python
Figure 4: Flagged and unflagged accounts have Botometer
scores under 1 (though flagged accounts score higher at a
statistically significant level). Inset shows a zoomed in y-
axis of larger plot. Bars show 95% confidence intervals.
This lack of difference between the two groups would
seem essential to both defeat bot-detection software already
running on Twitter, as well as provide authenticity in con-
versations. One working hypothesis is that the Russian trolls
might be software-assisted human workers, making it hard
to detect them with just bot-detection algorithms.
When we take the 6 categories into account, we see that all
categories’ scores for the flagged accounts are all higher than
the unflagged ones, but still lower than 2 (Table 6). Compar-
ing each category’s score of flagged accounts and unflagged
accounts shows not much difference, with the highest differ-
ence being when only using user-based features (0.49).
6.2 Flagged Accounts’ Behavioral Characteristics
Next, we highlight interesting quantitative covariates among
the flagged accounts. We believe these findings show that
the flagged accounts do reasonably resemble Russian trolls.
Deletion or suspension of accounts. As of January 13,
2019, 4 flagged accounts were suspended while 8 flagged
accounts showed up as not existing (the model was run on
Flagged Unflagged
User-based 1.3 (σ=1.25) 0.81 (σ=0.97)
Friends 1.35 (σ=0.95) 1.02(σ=0.67)
Network 1.33 (σ=1.01) 1.06 (σ=0.79)
Temporal 1.42 (σ=1.25) 1.08 (σ=0.99)
Content & Language 1.34 (σ=1.22) 0.94 (σ=0.91)
Sentiment 1.22 (σ=1.21) 0.88 (σ=0.92)
All 0.91 (σ=0.95) 0.54 (σ=0.61)
Table 6: Comparison of flagged and unflagged accounts’ av-
erage bot scores calculated using each category and all cate-
gories. Highest score is 5.
Flagged Unflagged
Total # of Account 1,441 1,485
Avg Account Age (days) 1202.43 2175.25
Avg # of Followers 2205.49 1621.7
Avg # of Following 1772.6 1361.57
Total # of Tweets 3,527,171 3,515,765
Avg # of Tweets 2447.72 2268.12
Avg of avg daily # of tweets 41.99 (σ=24.5) 26.83 (σ=16.9)
Table 7: Comparison of flagged and a subset of unflagged
accounts regarding account and tweet volume/rate.
the accounts before January 13 and these accounts existed at
that time).
Account information. In Table 7 we can see that on average
the flagged accounts had more followers and following that
unflagged accounts. Russian trolls had more number of fol-
lowers and following than the control accounts as well (Ta-
ble 1). The account age was calculated by getting the number
of days since account creation up to January 1st, 2019. We
can see that the flagged accounts are relatively newly created
compared to the unflagged ones, which is also a characteris-
tic of Russian trolls (cf. Table 1).
Tweet volume and rate. The flagged accounts (41.99)
tweeted more on a daily basis compared to unflagged ones
(26.83) with a higher standard deviation, as shown in Table
7.
Language. Note that since we ran the model on accounts
that recently mentioned high-profile political journalists in
U.S., it is likely that both flagged and unflagged accounts
use English most frequently. However, we can see that the
flagged accounts had more tweets in Russian compared to
the unflagged ones (Table 8).
Flagged Unflagged
Total tweets 3,527,171 Total Tweets 3,515,765
English tweets 3,368,336 English tweets 3,339,469
German tweets 6,736 Spanish tweets 5,767
Russian tweets 3,145 German tweets 3,833
Table 8: Comparison of the top 3 languages used in tweets
by the flagged and a subset of unflagged accounts.
Hashtags. As shown in Table 9, many of the top hashtags
Flagged Unflagged
#MAGA 12,385 #Trump 4,553
#TrumpResign 10,874 #MAGA 4,499
#Trump 7,879 #TrumpResign 3,809
#TrumpShutdown 6,230 #TrumpShutdown 3,047
#Resist 3,554 #ResignTrump 2,451
#allaboutthemusic 3,208 #BREAKING 2,078
#GOP 3,089 #TrumpShutDown 1,873
#Kavanaugh 2,358 #TheDailyBark 1,838
#TrumpRussia 2,257 #DogsOfBauwow 1,793
#labrador 2,180 #Kavanaugh 1,660
Table 9: Comparison of top 10 hashtags used by the flagged
and unflagged accounts.
used by the flagged and unflagged accounts overlap with the
majority being political ones, such as #MAGA and #Trump.
However, we can see the flagged accounts use more hash-
tags overall, such as using #MAGA more than twice as of-
ten as unflagged acccounts, despite the fact that the flagged
accounts had slight more tweets.
7 Discussion
We have presented results showing that: 1) Russian trolls
can be separated from a large control group of accounts ac-
tive at the same time; 2) that same computational model can
uncover likely Russian trolls still active on Twitter today;
and 3) that those flagged accounts don’t appear to be bots, at
least in the way that we currently understand bot behavior.
Next, we reflect on observations our raters made while ex-
amining flagged accounts, suggesting high-level strategies
used by Russian trolls today. We conclude this section with
thoughts on implications for social platforms.
Reflections on Flagged Accounts Our three raters closely
examined many flagged accounts still active on Twitter to-
day. While their observations are at their core anecdotal, we
believe they will be helpful to researchers to identify Rus-
sian troll accounts.
Mismatch of bio and tweets. Many flagged accounts had
discordant bios tweet content. For instance, some flagged
accounts had specific universities mentioned in their bio, but
none of the tweets the authors examined contained any ref-
erence to them.
Profile picture strategies. Profile pictures play important
roles in signalling identity on Twitter, and we witnessed var-
ious attempts to manage identity through profile pictures
among this group as well. For instance, some flagged ac-
counts used a middle-aged white person’s profile pic or a
cartoon photo while other accounts had no profile or (and)
no cover photo at all. One rater used reverse image engi-
neering to discover that one flagged account claimed to live
in Brooklyn, New York, with a profile picture of a restaurant
called “Brooklyn Bar and Grill.” However, that restaurant is
in Iceland. We believe it may be a common strategy to reuse
images found elsewhere on the internet as profile photos, as
creating unique and believable profile photos is costly.
Using controversial issues and aggressive behavior. Based
on the tweets we examined, some of the flagged accounts
Figure 5: Example of a flagged account replying back to var-
ious accounts in an aggressive manner, such as name-calling.
showed aggressive behavior. This included calling names
and tweeting about controversial issues like immigration or
gun control. An example is depicted in Figure 5.
Abnormal (re)tweet rate. The raters noted that many of the
flagged accounts showed high (re)tweet rate of mostly po-
litical content. For instance, one account has been tweeting
roughly 65 times per day. For example, one of the flagged
accounts examined by our raters has tweeted over 44,200
times since January 2017.
7.1 Implications for Social Platforms
One key takeaway from our study is that identifying active
Russian trolls on Twitter is possible given even limited ac-
cess to tweets and user data. It follows that social platforms
that have access to complete data about users, their con-
tent, and their interactions, can identify Russian trolls among
their users. We argue that social platforms should take the
initiative to build models and tools to police these accounts.
As indicated by our Botometer results, current bot-detection
efforts are unlikely to sweep up most Russian troll accounts.
8 Future Work
8.1 Social Platforms Other than Twitter
Research has shown that the Russian trolls’ activities were
different on different platforms. For instance, campaigns
on Facebook targeted interests of African-Americans and
Mexican-Americans, while the Twitter campaign focused
more on topics such as general news and politics (Spangher
et al. 2018). Thus, it would be interesting to see how our
model can be adpated to other social platforms such as Face-
book and Reddit and whether our qualitative findings hold
on other platforms.
8.2 Publicly Available Models
We have made our models available to broader research
community in order to spark more research on this and re-
lated topics. For instance, using these models we might be
able to understand the social networks of trolls—something
that cannot be done with the 2016 election dataset’s troll ac-
counts, as Twitter deleted them. Furthermore, we hope that
our publicly available models may help other researchers to
flag and interrogate accounts with questions such as “What
are their objectives?” and “Have they affected users’ politi-
cal beliefs?”
9 Conclusion
Due to the societal importance and impact of social media,
coordinated efforts by adversarial individuals and organiza-
tions, e.g., trolls of the IRA, have the potential to substan-
tially negatively impact society. Here, we show that Twitter
accounts belonging to Russian trolls can be used to iden-
tify new suspected troll accounts. We develop a new ma-
chine learning model that in cross-validation tests achieves
an AUC of 98.9%, allowing us to identify and study new
trolls to answer unanswered questions about their activity.
When testing our model on accounts that recently mentioned
prominent journalists—a likely action to influence the con-
versation about U.S. politics—we find that Russian trolls are
likely still active, with 3.7% of the accounts contacting these
journalists being flagged as suspected Russian trolls. Our hu-
man evaluation suggests that roughly 70% of these accounts
are valid. Finally, we argue that the platforms, which have
access to internal signals, can succeed at similar or better
rates at finding and deactivating similar adversarial actors.
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